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TROTSKY ~ !Hi MOSCOW TREASON TRIALS 
", 
INTRODreTION 
Someone has said that Hitler failed to conquer 
Russia because there was no strong internal ally, i.e. 
'Fifth Column', to prepare for his armies. Such an opinion 
heaps enormous credit upon Joseph Stalin because he launched 
investigations and trials of alleged traitors as early as 
1935. So~e critics prefer to call the trials and resultant 
executions 'blood purges' since they also served the purpose 
of eliminating virtually all of Stalin's political opponents. 
Long before the rest of the world learned by 
tragic experience about the infiltration methods of the 
Nazis, Stalin's government claimed that it had uncovered 
a faSCist-supported conspiracy which aimed at paralyzing 
Russia from within in case of an armed invasion. When the 
first group of 'traitors' came to trial in August, 1936, 
the charges gained international importance and foreign 
diplomats and journalists watched the proceedings of this 
and two subsequent trials with increasing interest. 
To some observers the trials represented an excuse 
by Stalin to rid himself' of' troublesome politicians who had 
some weight in public life by virtue of their past prominence 
in'the Party and in the Russian Revolution. Among these were 
such men as Zinoviev and Kamenev, who at one. time shared the 
Party leadership with Stalin; 'Rykov, former Prime Minister; 
Bukharin, one-time director. of Izvestia, and many others. 
! j, 
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Stalin was trying to kill off his former associates, his 
anti-Soviet critics claimed, in order to stand as the sole 
important figure surviving the Bolshevik Revolution and, 
thus, the unchallenged leader of the Russian state. 
Other observers, who were already decrying the 
menace of fascism, appreciated the caustic rebuffs dealt 
the designs of Germany, Italy and Japan. They saw the 
detailed accounts of sabotage plots as a pattern of what 
was being done in France, Norway, Czechoslovakia. The 
experience of a second World War, including Hitler's 
unsuccessful attack upon the Soviet Uhion, mayor may not 
be taken as justification of this indirect praise for 
Stalin's roresight. And as for the justice and validity 
of the charges against Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov and 
company it remains a matter for debate. 
But one of the main purposes and results of the 
three Moscow trials, as fully recognized at the time, was 
the attempt by the prosecution to destroy once and for all 
any influence which Leon Trotsky might still have in Russia. 
It is this phase of the trials with which this study attempts 
to deal. The confessions of the accused built up a sordid 
tale of deceit and intrigue around Trotsky's name. With 
Trotsky as subject, one could read the record of the trials 




for Trotsky's own voluminous writings (he estimated them 
at 5,000 printed pages up to 1938) it is possible that 
posterity would remember him only as a Benedict Arnold 
or, to be more exact, an Aaron Burr. 
The rather unconventional proceedure of Soviet 
criminal trials, however, caused many disinterested voices 
to be raised in Trotsky's defense. They spoke for justice 
and asked that he be given the right to state his case. 
In the United states prominent publications like the 
Foreign Affairs Quarterly, Reader's Digest, Saturday 
Evening~, American Mercury, the ~ ~ Times along 
with other newspapers opened their pages to anti-Soviet 
writers who described the trials with such terms as: 
"Stalin's vengeance on Trotsky" and the product of 
"Stalin's oriental vindictiveness. ff The Louisville 
Courier-Journal met the second Moscow trial with this 
sarcastic editorial on January 24, 1937: 
"With Leon Trotzky safe from Soviet justice in his new-found haven in Mexico, Russia 
is putting on another one of those fantastic 
shows, a treason trial and a trial of alleged 
Trotzkyists. Karl Radek and sixteen others are 
facing Red judges on the charge of conspiring 
to overthrow the Stalin regime. Like Gregory 
Zinoviett and Leon Kameneff, they are leading 
figures in the Communist State. unlike the two 
former rulers of the Soviet Uhion, they have 
been on friendly terms ~ith the dictator until very 
recently, but like them·their fate is sealed. 
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"Russian justice is that way. Once the 
accused is brought to trial, he is guilty. 
The proceedings are carried on only to allow 
the' prisoner, or prisoners, to make an abject 
confession. The preliminary investigation and 
the work of the secret police leave no other 
recourse than admission of guilt. The 
preliminary questioning and the third degree 
of the OGPU with its warning tJlat members of 
the victim's family will be puhished unless 
he makes a clean breast of the case, foreshadow 
the doom to come. 
" ••••• How Radek fell from grace perhaps will 
never be known. His confession, if he makes 
one, will throw no light on the so-called 
Trotzky conspiracy. The chargee and the argument 
of the prosecutor will offer no enlightment. 
The fact that he fell from grace is the all-important 
thing and for this he no doubt is convicted in 
advance. n 
The list of authors who wrote in this v.1n 
is large: ~ Eastman, Trotsky's former official 
translator; Albert Goldman, Trotsky's American lawyer; 
Alexander Barmine, former official in the Russian 
Foreign Office; "General" Krivitsky, who appeared 
before the Dies Committee as a former member of the 
OGPU; Isaac Don Levine and William Henry Chamberlain, 
rabid anti-Soviet feature writers for the Hearst Press, 
and James Burnham, who claimed the trials were an insidi-
ous attempt on Stalin's part to enlist the aid of France, 
Great Britain and the United states in a 'holy war' 
1 
against the Axis. 
But the most important defense of Trotsky was 
made by himself--not in another book but in his personal 
testimony before an international commission of inquiry 
-5-
which sat at his Mexico retrea~ in the Spring of 1938. 
The commission was headed QY the eminent philosopher, 
Dr. John Dewey, who added stature to the humanitarian 
purpose of the cause, namely, to give a man who was 
convicted in absentia an opportunity to state his case. 
This study will, therefore, treat a dual 
sub~ect: the career of Leon Trotsky as revealed in 
the evidence at the Moscow trials compared with Trotsky's 
own defense and account of his political activity. There 
can be little reconciliation of the two fields of investi-
g~tion because they lie at different poles. The truth 
probably falls in the realm of a compromise but it is 
difficult to ascertain and meaningless to search for. 
The thesis must rest content with uncovering and bringing 
together from a variety of sources the two interpretations 
of Trotsky's political activity. On the one hand, the 
official translations of the Moscow trial proceedings spin 
a tale of treason; on the other, a transcript of Trotsky's 
testimony before the Mexico inquiry commission presents 
his defense. Other authentic comment from reliable on-the-
spot observers will be employed when advisable. 
Such an undertaking presents a huge problem in 
planning. The plan of this study is as follows: first, 
a chapter on the Moscow trials; then a section on Trotsky's 
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counter-revolutionary activity from 1923 to 1936 as 
revealed in the testimony of the accused in the three 
trials; a chapter on Trotsky's rebuttal and defense, 
and a concluding section dealing with the question of 
the authenticity of the confessions and justice of the 
, charges against the accused. The latter is pertinent 
to the subject of Trotsky because he himself denounced 
the trials as a "frame-up" and quoted many possible 
theories to explain why his former friends lied about him. 
What emerges from the su~dy is not a concrete 
conclusion. But instead, two irreconciableset of 'facts' 
are presented--facts in the sense that both claim to be 
substantiated by evidence. The account seeks no conclusion 
and attempts to incorporate no bias. The nature of the 
case warrants neither. 
(Needed footnotes are bound at the end. Where 
statements are made which seemingly need documentation 
but are not carried in footnotes, the material was 
taken directly from one of the four primary sources listed 
in the Bibliography. Pages numbers in the body of the 
text apply to the appropriate primary source material. 
For example, testimony quoted from Trotsky is taken from 
the Q.u!. ~ Leon Trotsky, report of the proceedings of 
the commission of inquiry; Material relating to one of the 
trials is lifted from the official report of trial proceed-
ings published by the Soviet Government). 
I. TRIED FOR TREASON 
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I • TRIED FOR TREASOll 
The story of the Moscow trials has its immediate 
inception in the murder of Comrade Sergei Kirov, secretary 
of the Communist Party in Leningrad. The event served to 
start the secret police on a trail of investigation which 
did not end until several years later. 
At 4:27 p.m. on December 1, 1934, Kirov left 
his office in the Smolny Institute in Leningrad. He 
walked down a long marble-lined corridor leading to a 
chamber where he was to deliver a report on the Central 
Committee's decision to abolish bread-rationing. As he 
passed an intersecting corridor, a man sprang out, thrust 
a revolver at the back of his head and fired. Within three 
2 
minutes, Sergei Kirov was dead. 
The assassin, Leonid l~ikolayev, attempted to flee 
and then to shoot himself, but police seized him before he 
could do either. 
The murder had an electrifying effect on other 
members of the Communist Party. Although Kirov was a 
relatively minor offiCial, Stalin and other high officers 
personally visited Leningrad to lend prestige to the 
investigation. The Soviet press informed the world that 
the assassination was the work of "White Guardists", one 
hundred and four of whom were reported rounded up and shot 
within two weeks. 
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On December 28, Leonid Nikolayev and twelve 
of his alleged accomplices were placed on trial in a 
closed session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme 
3 
Court of the U.S.S.R. Nikolayev, according.to Soviet 
news dispatches at the time, confessed that a foreign 
consul in Leningrad paid him five thousand rubles for 
organizing the terrorist gr.ouP to kill Kirov. 
All members of the diplomatic corps demanded, 
since they were compromised, that the GPU reveal the 
name of the foreign official. Within a few days he 
was identified as the Latvian consul, Bisseneks, who 
4 
left Russia immediately for Finland. 
The U1litary Collegium sentenced Nikolayev 
• 
and his companions (including Kotolynov, Rumyantsev 
a~d Sossitsky) to be shot. After they were executed 
the investigation eontinued. The Party appointed a 
special investigator, N. I. Yezhov, who soon implicated 
political figures in Moscow with responsibility for the 
crime. Two weeks after Nikolayev's trial closed, the 
Military Collegium was called upon to try Grigori Zinoviev, 
Leo Kamenev and Ivan Bakayev on charges of "moral responsi-
bility" for Kirov's death. 
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Zinoviev and Kamenev, both veterans of the 
early revolutionary struggle for power, admitted that 
they belonged to a "Moscow C enter tf of political opposi-
tion to the Party leadership and that they had been involved 
in activities which "created an atmosphere" conducive to 
5 
"anti-Soviet activities. t1 The verdict of the court: 
"The trial did not bring to light 
any facts furnishing grounds for qUalifYing 
the acts of the members of the Moscow Center 
in connection with the assassination of Comrade 
S. M. Kirov on December 1, 1934, as being a 
direct incitement to this heinous crime; 
nevertheless, the trial has completely cohfirmed 
the fact that the membe.rs of the counter-
revolutionary Moscow center were aware of the 
terrorist sentiments of the Leningrad group 
and inflamed these sentiments.lI 
Zinoviev was sentenced to ten years' impriso~­
ment and Kamenev to five. Seventeen other persons 
received similar prison terms. 
Continued investigation also implicated agents 
of the GPU in Leningrad. One week after the Zinoviev-
Kamenev trial, the head of the Leningrad section of the 
secret police, Medved, and eleven of his fellow officer. 
were put on trial for "having information on the plot 
against Kirov" but not taking "measures to discover and 
6 
put an end to it." They also were given prison terms. 
The GPU's part in Kirov's murder became clearer only three 




ot a widespread plot to kill other Soviet Leaders. 
The new evidence allegedly showed that the Leningrad 
terrorist group was only a small section of a larger 
center for terrorist activity. The larger unit was 
directed in Moscow and was said to have the tommal 
name of "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center. II 
At ten minutes past noon on A~ust 19, 1936, 
sixteen members of the Moscow center went on trial before 
the Military Collegium (the section of the Soviet Supreme 
Court which handles crimes against the state) on charges 
of treason. Zinoviev and Kamenev were brought back from 
prison to be the leading defendants representing the 
Zinovievite faction. I. N. Smirnov, former Red Army 
officer and former associate of Trotsky, was the accused 
leader of the Trotskyites. Most of the others were 
confessed killers, spies and disgruntled politicians. 
President of the court was Army Military 
Jurist v. V. Ulrich, who was assisted by Army Corps 
Military Jurist I. O. Matulevich and Jurist I. I. 
Nikitchenko. (From page 7 of the Case of the Trotskyite-
Zinovievite Terrorist Center, printed in Moscow, 1936). 
The setting of the trial is described by the 
former American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph 
Davies, in his book, Mission !Q Moscow. He said that 
« 
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the October Hall of the House of Trade Unions, where the 
trial was held, was a former fashionable club in the 
Czarist days. The three judges sat at the front of the hall 
in an elevated dias. Five feet below the dias was a well 
containing the witness stand and a desk for the court 
secretary. The defendants sat in four rows of four each 
in a jury-box affair to the right of the dias. On the 
opposite side of the well sat Prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky. 
The large, high-ceilinged hall was always crowded with hun-
dreds of workers--a different group at each session. The 
press gallery was filled with foreign officials as well 
9 
as newsmen from both foreign and domestic news services. 
Ulrich formally opened the court by introducing 
the accused and asking them if they objected to the 
composition of the court or the state prosecution. They 
indicated no objection. He then announced that all of 
the accused "have declined the services of counseL tor 
defense" but added that "all rights of defense are extended 
to them personally, i.e., the right to put questions to 
witnesses and to the other accused, to petition the court 
in all matters of proceedure, to deliver speeches in their 
own defense, etc." (Page 9) 
secretary: 
The bulky indictment was then read by the 
10 
It ••• On the strength of newly revealed 
circumstances ascertained by the investigating 
authorities in 1936 in connection with the discov-
ery of a number of terrorist groups of Trotskyites 
and Zinovievites, the investigation has established 
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, 
that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov and Bakayev, who 
were convicted in _the "MOscow centre" case (1935), 
actually not only knew that their adherents in 
Leningrad were inclined towards terrorism, but were the 
direct organizers of the assassination of Comrade 
s. M. Kirov. 
" ••• These newly revealed circumstances 
establish without a doubt thata 
1) At the end of,1932 the Trotskyite 
and Zinovievite groups united and formed a united 
centre consisting of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov 
and Bakayev (from the Zinovievites) and I. N. Smirnov, 
Ter-Vaganyan and Mrachkovsky (from the Trotskyites), 
all ch~ged in the present'case. 
2) The principal condition for the union 
of these counter-revolutionary groups was their common 
recognition of the nec~ssity for individual terrorism 
against the leaders ot theCPSU and the Soviet 
Government. 
3) Precisely from that time onwards the 
Trotskyites and Zinovievites, acting on direct 
instruction from Leon Trotsky,received by the united 
centre through special agents, concentrated their 
hostile activities against the ePSU and the Soviet 
Government mainly on the ~rganization of terrorism 
against the most prominent leaders of the Party 
and the Government. 
4) With this end in view the united center 
organized special terrorist groups, which prepared a 
number of practical measures for the assassination 
of Comrades Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kirov, 
Orjonikidz, Zhdanov, Kossior, Postyshev and others. 
5) One of these terrorist groups, consisting 
of NiKolayev· , Rumyantsev and others, who were 
convicted by the Military Collegium on December 28-29, 
1934, carried out the foul murder of Comrade S. M. 
Kirov. (Pages 10-11) 
The indictment then launched into a lengthy 
recital of the testimony already collected from the sixteen 
-
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defendants in pre-trial examinations. The indictment 
quoted volume and page number of the testimony collected 
and these volumes stood ready for use on the desk of 
Prosecutor Vyshinsky. 
The essence of the charge was that a Trotskyite-
Zinovievite terrorist center had been formally organized 
in 1932; that it had no political program of its own; that 
the accused readily admitted the success and greatness of 
Comrade Stalin's leadership, but were blinded by such 
great thirst for political control that they sank to 
terrorism and White-guardism. 
"The accused in this case," the document said, 
"have fully admitted their guilt of the charges preferred 
against them. The only exception is I. N. Smirnov, who 
catagorically denies that he took part in the terroristic 
activities of the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre." 
But testimony from seven other defendants and one witness 
was quoted to prove that Smirnov was lying. (Page 38) 
Leon Trotsky and his son, L. D. Sedov, were 
dealt with also in the indictment: 
"Having been exposed by the materials 
in the present case as having directly prepared 
and personally guided the work of organizing the 
terroristic acts against the leaders of the CPSU 
and of the Soviet State, they (Trotsky and Sedov) 
are subject to immediate arrest and trial by the 
~litary Collegium, in the event of their being 
discovered on the territory of the U.S.S.R." 
--<Page 38) 
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After the reading of the indictment, Comrade 
Ulrich asked the accused in turn if they were pleading 
guilty. Fourteen answered in the affirmative, but 
Smirnov and Holtzman denied personal participation in 
preparation of terroristic acts. 
The first of the accused t~ testify is 
Mrachkovsky, whom the court record describes 8S "the 
man most in the confidence of Trotsky and personally 
closest to him~tt (Page 4O) He blamed Trotsky with 
ereatioh of the terrorist center·thro~h connection with 
Smirnov. He related that Smirnov brought instructions 
from Trotsky which he had obtained in Berlin in 1931 
from Trotsky's son, Sedov, urging Trotsky followers to 
resort to terrorism. The message in effect said: "Until 
. we put Stalin out of the way, we shall not be able to 
come back to power." 
VYSHINSKY: "What do you mean by the 
expression: Until we put Stalin out of the way?" 
MRACHKOVSKY: "Until we kill Stalin. 
At that very first meeting in the presence of 
Smirnov, myself, Ter-Vaganyan and Safonova, I 
was given the task of organizing a terrorist 
group, that is to say, to select reliable people •. 
••• That period, 1931 to 1932 was spent in preparing 
people for acts against Stalin, Voroshilov and 
Kaganovich." . 
Dreitzer, next on the stand, collaborated 
Mrachkovsky's testimony and then launched into a 
-
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denouncement of Smirnov's vacillating position. He said 
the question of a united front with Zinovievites arose 
in 1932 and the Trotskyi~es sent a letter through Holtzman 
asking Trotsky's advice. Trotsky's reply came through a 
man named Gavin, instructing that the basis of the union 
should be terrorism. 
Turning to Smirnov, Vyshinsky asked if it was 
he who received the letter through Gavin. Smirnov replied 
in the affirmative. 
"There could be no acting on one's own," Dreitzer 
told the court. "No orchestra without a conductor. I am 
surprised at the assertions of Smirnov, who, according to 
his words, both knew and did not know, spoke and did not. 
speak, acted and did not act. This is not true." (Page 51) 
Dreitzer also told of two meetings he had with 
L. sedov in a cate in Leipziger Strasse in Berlin in the 
autumn of 1931. He was told by Sedov that instructions 
would be sent from Trotsky later. These instruction 
came three years later in a German cinema m~azine brought 
from Warsaw by Sedov's sister. A letter in Trotsky's 
handwriting in invisible ink urged speeding of plans to 
assassinate Stalin and Voroshilov. Both Dreitzer and 
Mrachkovsky affirm that the letter was read by them and th~n 
• 
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burned for reasons of secrecy. 
Several lesser figures in this first trial 
testifY to numerous attempts on the life of public 
leaders. Bakayev says he was involved .in a plot against 
Stalin in October, 1934, together with Kamenev, Evdokimov 
and others. 
Pickel said he participated in plans for two 
other attempts on Stalin's life. One took place in the 
autumn of 1932 under the direction of Zinoviev and the 
other in 1933 with Bogdan, Zinoviev's secre'tary, as the 
. designated assassin. No details of the three plots are 
are given in the court record, however. 
Only very indirect hint at German interest in 
the Russian terrorist groups is contained in the first 
trial. Nathan Lurye, an admitted Trotskyite, confessed 
that he was a member of a terrorist group headed by a 
German engineer-architect, Franz Weitz, who supposedly 
had told Lurye in confidence that.he had been sent to the 
USSR on instructions from Heinrich Himm1 er, then chief 
of the troops and later chief of the Gestapo. 
v. Olberg, another of the accused, attempted to 
allign Sedov with the German secret police when he testi-
fied that Sedov secured a false passport from a Nazi 
agent in order to make an illegal entry into Russia for 
Olberg in order that he might carry out terrorist work. 
The passport, bearing the credentials of a Latin American 
• 
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country, was introduced by Vyshinsky as the sole bit of 
documentary evidence to be introduced at the trial. 
Holtzman, F'ritz David and K. B. Bermin-Yurin, 
all first-trial defendant~told the court they met 
Trotsky in Copenhagen in late 1932 and received personal 
commissions to organize assassination plots against Stalin 
and other government officials. 
The three principal figures of the first trial 
(Zinoviev, Kamenev and Smirnov) were saved until last to 
testify. Meanwhile, the sensationAl'ertdence unveiled-by 
the accused in their testimony created nation-wide attention 
through the Soviet press. "Probably nothing since Lenin's 
death so universally stirred public emotion in Russia,tt 
said R. T. Miller, long-time correspondent of the London 
Daily Herald. "The man-in-the-street felt himself personally 
menaced and injured ••• and wanted corresponding vengeance. 
No one who knows Russians and talked to them, even casually 
••• could doubt this. For days there was scarcely another 
topic of conversation; a home, cafe, hotel, waiting room 
or tram car that did not clatter with the names on the 
indictment; a newspaper unopened to the report of the testi-
mony. Sentiment was all but excluded from the court-room, 
11 
however, and the conduct of the trial was exemplary." 
Before a packed house, Zinoviev described his 
part in the counter-revolutionary struggle, attributing it 
to baser motives than Kamenev or Smirnov would admit. 
Zinoviev told the the court that "we were convinced 
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tfthat the leadership must be supenteded at all costs, that 
it must Qe super~ded by us, along with Trotsky. In this 
situation I had meetings with Smirnov who has accused me 
here of frequently telling untruths. Yes, I often told 
untruths. I started doing that from the mement I began fight-
ing the Bolshevik Party. In so far ~s Smirnov took the 
road of fighting the Party, he too is telling the untruth. 
But it seems, the difference between him and ~self is that 
I have decided firm~ and irrevocably to tell at this last 
moment the truth, whereas, he, it seems, has adopted a 
different decision.- (Page 72) 
Kamanev was one of the more provocative defendants. 
His testimony outlined the plan of action by the Trotskyite-
Zinovievite Terrorist Center, thereby implication several 
prominent Russian leaders of the Right Opposition--Rykov, 
Bukharin and Tomsky. He also volunteered that Sokolnikov 
was a secret member of the center. 
The following day of the trial, with the examination 
of the accused completed, Prosecutor Vyshinsky made an 
electrifying announcement. He said he had ordered investiga-
tion of Tomsky, Rykov, Bukharin, Uglanov, Radek and Pyatakov 
because of the testimony of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Reingold. 
Thus, the ground was laid for a second and third Moscow trial. 
The morning of August 22 was devoted to Vyshinsky's 
long speech for the prosecution. He recapitulated the 
testimony, drew a hideous picture of terroristic activity 
., 
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and warned persons contemplating terrorism to beware. He 
assailed Trotsky and generally extolled the virtues of the 
Communist Party program under the leadership of Stalin. 
One paragraph of Vyahinsky's long harangue will give its 
essence: 
~uring the preceding days of the trial, 
these gentlemen tried to strike a noble attitude. 
They, or at all events their leaders, spoke about 
their terroristic plot with a certain pose; they 
sought and expected a political evaluation of their 
crimes; they talked about political struggle, about 
some kind of political agreement as with some kind of 
alleged politieal parties. And, although they 
admitted that in reality they had no political 
platform, that they did not even feel the need to draw 
up a platform because, on their own admission, 
their platform eould be written at one sitting in a 
couple of hours, nevertheless, they tried to pose 
as genuine political figures •••• And when they spoke 
about the interests of the working class, about 
the interests of the people, when they will speak 
about this, in their speeches for the defense and in 
their last pleas, they will lie as they have lied hitherto, 
as they are lying now, for they fought against the only 
people's policy, against the policy of our country, 
against our Soviet policy. Liars and clowns, insigni-
ficant pigmies, little dogs snarling at an elephant, 
this is what this gang represents." (Page 122) 
After the accused had made their last pleas, the 
t.rial came to a close at 7 p.m. on August 23, four days 
after it began. The verdict, condemning all sixteen to be 
shot, was read at 2:30 p.m. the following day. Within 24 
hours the sentences were executed. 
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2. Second Trial 
Following through on his announcement of further 
investigations, Vyshinsky collected another 17 persons 
for trial before the Military Collegium. The principal 
defendant was Pyatakov, old-time associate of Trotsky. 
He was charged with using his strategic office as 
Assistant People's Commissar for Heavy Industry to formulate 
a sabotage program which would have paralyzed the Soviet 
Union in case of armed attack. Also on trial were 
Sokolnikov, former Assistant Peoplets Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs, Radek, Serebryakov and Muralov--all of whom 
confessed previous association with the Trotskyite 
underground. 
The trial opened on January 23, 1937 with COPrade 
V. V. Ulrich again presiding. The subject of this second 
trial was sabotage, just as terrorism had been the theme 
of the first. The principal difference in the two cases 
was the fact that Vyshinsky was now able to link the 
conspiracy to foreign connections. Germany and Japan 
are mentioned specifically by several of the accused. 
For the most part, however, Vyshinsky guards against direct 
accusations or denunciations of either of the two fascist 
powers. 
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Pyatakov was the first before the microphone. 
One observer said he "looked like a college professor 
12 
delivering a lecture." He quietly admitted that he was 
the leader of the Trotskyite organization and that he 
had been guilty of numerous crimes of sabotage. American 
Ambassador Davies attended the trial sessions regularly 
and felt the material of sufficient weight to give it 
priority in his report to Washington as well as a large 
place in his diary (~8sion !2 Moscow). This is his 
summary of the principal defendants: 
"SOKOLNIKOV: Round face, swarthy, and high 
forehead. He delivered himself of what might appear 
to be a dispassionate lecture upon his participation 
in the conspiracy, and expounded logically and clearly 
the reasons which prompted him and his associates to 
launch upon a plot with Japan and Germany; the basis 
of which was that there was no possibility of project-
ing their plans for the betterment of the Russian people 
internally because the Stalin government was so strongly 
entrenched that mass action within could not overthrow 
it and that historically they had reason to believe 
that their best chance was to rise to power through 
a foreign war and to create a smaller state out of 
the embers, because of the friendly disposition of the 
victors (Germany and Japan), and the probable attitude 
of the western powers of Europe in the resultant peace 
arrangements. 
"SEREBRYAKOV: As mild-mannered a pirate as 
ever slit a throat (with a cherubic face), who casually 
recited horror after horror which he had projected. 
He seemed more or less resigned in his demeanor. 
"MURALOV: A soldierly-looking man with a 
goatee, a shock of gray hair, and fmne aquiline features. 
He conducted himself with fine dignity, and appeared 
manly and straightforward. There were many indicia of 
ow 
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truth speaking in the natural manner in which he told 
of his reasons for supporting Trotsky as one of his 
oldest and best friends and a great man, who had been 
a man "when others were mice,1t and again when he spoke 
of his reasons for refusal to confess, and his 
ultimate recantation. 
ItRADEK: (short and stocky with an aggressive 
and brilliant personality), rather dominated the court-
room. He was dressed like a peasant and his personality 
was accentuated by a fringe of whiskers underneath his 
chin. His attitude was that he was one of the political 
leaders in the plot and that, while he had not personally 
participated in these specific crimes ••• he had knowledge 
thereof, and did not seek to evade responsibility ••• 
He had several sharp colloquies with the prosecutor 
and did not come off second best." 
Davies also reveals that the prevailing opinion 
among the entire diplomatic corps in Moscow, Ifwith possibly 
one exception," was that the proceedings established clearly 
the existence of a political plot and conspiracy to over-
13 
throw the government. 
After the direct examinations, Vyshinsky gave his 
lengthy concluding speech in which he asked death for all 
the accused. One paragraph of his speech seemed to rise 
above the surroundings and strike a note of unusual sincerity. 
"We are keenly interested," he said, "that the government of 
every country which desires peace, and is fighting for peace, 
should take the most determined measures, to put a stop to 
every attempt at.criminal espionage, diversive, terroristic 
activities organized by the enemies of peace, by the enemies 
of democracy, by the dark fascist forces which are preparing 
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for war, which are preparing to wreck the cause of peace, 
and consequently, the cause of the whole of advancedf the 
14 
whole of progressive humanity." 
The last pleas of the accused did not bother to 
ask for mercy except by the lesser personalities. The 
longest and most logical was that of Radek, who gave a 
chronological account of his entanglement with the 
conspiracy. 
At 7:15 p.m. on January 29, the Qourt retired 
to prepare its verdict. At 3 a.m. the three judges returned 
to the bench with the verdict: thirteen (including Pyatakov) 
were. to be shot; Sokolnikov and Radek, prison terms of 
ten years each; and two lesser figures also imprisonment. 
ItNot until three in the morning did Judge Ulrich 
convene the last session to read the sentence," one observer 
said. lilt was received in complete silence, without a stir 
of the audience. Of' all the prisoners, only Radek betrayed 
a sign of emotion, as his grimly resigned face suddenly went 
. 15 
blank at the news that he was to be spared. 1I 
. 
Why was Radek Spared? Some critics who discounted 
the validity of the trials claimed that Radek unwittingly 
mentioned the name of Tukhachevsky, Assistant People's 
Commissar of War, in his testimony. On the second day of 
trial Radek had said: "Vitaly Putna came to see me with 
some request from Tukhachevsky." Vyshinsky asked him the 
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next day why he had mentioned Tukhachevsky. Radek 
promptly denied that Tukhachevsky had any knowledge of 
his (Radek's) true role as a conspirator or had any 
connection with the anti-Soviet movement. In any 
event, further investigation sealed Tukhachevsky's fate. 
Four months after the trial he was demoted to a minor 
command on the Volga- And the following month he was 
brought to stand court martial along with seven other 
Red Army generals before the Military Tribunal of the 
Soviet Supreme Court. The trial was held behind closed 
doors. The Soviet announcement of the trial said the 
generals were accused of being in the employ of the 
military intelligence of a country "carrying on an 
unfriendly policy toward the U.S.S.R.tf The official 
16 
report continued: 
"The defendants systematically supplied 
secret information about the position of the Red 
Army to military circles of this (unfriendly) 
country. 
ffThey carried on wrecking activities 
for weakening the Red Army to prepare for the 
defeat of the Red Army in case of attack on the 
Soviet Union •••• " 
Each of the eight generals was found guilty and shot. 
Radek also gave some information linking 
Trotsky with Rudolph Hess in preparation of plans for 
a German attack on Russia. This information will be 
stated presently. 
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Since the second trial had unfolded a story 
of international intrigue it made even more startling 
news in the political circles of the world than had the 
first. Foes of Naziism quickly pointed to the "Fifth 
column" movement which the trial allegedly uncovered 
and warned of approaching disaster for other nations. 
They saw the possibility of ousted and frustrated poli-
ticians in other countries following the pattern of 
Trotsky in making secret deals with the Nazis. These 
spokesmen praised and justified Stalin's stern action. 
Ambassador Davies recorded a frank conversa-
tion he had with Foreign Minister Litvinov on July 4, 
1937, relating to the trials. "The Soviet Government 
has to make sure through trials and executions,tt Litvinov 
told him, "that no trace of treason is left which would 
cooperate with Berlin or Tokyo at the outbreak of war. 
Some day the world will understand, will understand that 
what we have done was to protect the Government from 
17 
menacing treason. 1t 
3. The Third Trial 
In May, 1937, an official government statement 
said that Bukharin, Rykov and To~ky--members of the 
h 
former Right Opposition--had been ordered arrested for in-
vestigation on treason charges. Tomsky, evading arrest, committed 
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suicide. Bukharin and Rykov stayed in jail nearly a year 
while the Government pushed its investigation of the 
conspiracy to the last ditch. At last, on March 2, 1938, 
Prosecutor Vyshinsky felt certain he had uprooted the 
whole of the fascist-supported movement and placed 21 
citizens on trial before the Military Collegium on charges 
of treason. Beside Bukharin and Rykov, the defendants 
included Krestinsky and Rakovsky (confessed Trotskyites) 
and G. G. Yagoda, chairman of the GPU. 
Vyshinsky called this the third layer of the 
conspiracy and gave it the title: the IIBloc of Rights 
and Trotskyites." This third level of' the conspiracy 
was the most powerf'ul and the most secret. Its discovery 
(in trial proceedings) led to a full-dress exhibition of' 
the foreign alliances behind the internal conspirators. 
Trotsky, as in the other two trials, is the arch criminal. 
The full picture of a threatening foreign pact is the 
theme of the third indictment. Foreign sponsorship had 
been only a vague suggestion in the first trial, and a 
strong probability in the second. But now it stood out 
in bold relief. 
The details of the German-Japanese connection 
with the traitors is not as clear as it might be since 
their specific testimony on the subject was received at 
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an in camera session on March 9. The closed meeting is 
reported in the verbatim report of the trial, published 
18 
by the Soviet Government, as follows: 
"At the session in camera the accused 
Rakovsky, Grinko, Rosenboltz and Krestinsky gave 
evidence about their treasonable, espionage 
connections with certain official representatives 
of certain foreign states. 
ttThe Court established both the exact 
identity of the representatives with whom the 
above-mentioned conspirators from the anti-Soviet 
ttbloc of Rights 'and Trotskyites II were connected, 
and the states they represented ••••• 
.. 
"At this session in camera, the accused 
G. G. Yagoda gave testimony in which he fully 
admitted to organizing the murder of Comrade 
M. A. Peshkov, stating that he had pursued 
personal as well as conspiratorial aims in 
committing this murder." (Page 624) 
Vyshinsky's indictment in the third trial set 
forth the full story of the conspiracy as he saw it. 
It had five specific charges against the accused: 1) 
that the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites was formed in 
1932-33 on instructions of intelligence services of 
foreign states hostile to the USSR; 2) that the bloc 
anticipated receiving armed assistance from these foreign 
states; 8) that the bloc systematically engaged in 
espionage; 4) that the bloc performed diversionist 
acts in such spheres as finance, municipal development, 
industry, agriculture and railways, and 5) that the bloc 
= 
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organized a number o~ terrorist acts against Soviet 
leaders and were actually responsible ~or the murders 
o~ S. M. Kirov, V. R. Menzhinsky, V. V. Kuibyshev and 
A. M. Gorky. 
In connection with the latter charge, the 
third trial was somewhat sensational for its revelation 
of the career of Yagoda as a veteran political murderer. 
He is revealed to have been a secret member o~ the "bloc 
o~ Rights and Trotskyites" from the beginning, his 
m~bership being known only to the trio of top leaders--
Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky. Yagoda continued as 
chairman of the GPU for three years after he aided in 
the assassination of Kirov (See page 11). According to 
his confession, he had been responsible ~or making 
Trotsky's exile to Siberia (in 1927) less severe because 
of his position as vice-chairman of the old secret police. 
In the summer o~ 1934 Yagoda decided it was time for his 
elevation to the post of chairman of the GPU. Vyachesllv 
Menzhinsky, the ailing chairman, was hastened to his death 
by a physician whom Yagoda engaged to prescribe wrong 
treatment for his illness. 
Enlisting other physicians, Yagoda also planned 
in the same manner the early deaths of Valerian V. 
Kuibyshev, chairman of the Supreme Council of the National 
Economw; Maxim Gorky, the famed Russian writer; and Gorky's 
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son, Peshkov. The three physicians accused of perpetrating 
the murders--Dr. Lev G. Levin, Dr. I. N. Kazakov and 
Dr. D. D. Pletnev--were defendants in the third trial. 
The Yagoda episode is only a bit of by-play 
from the primary function of the indictment in the third 
trial. Its purpose was to link the Right Opposition with 
the traitorous plans of the Trotskyites to betray Russia 
into the hands of the Germans. Both Rykov and Bukharin 
gave detailed testimony on agreements with Germany in the 
event of an attack by Germany upon the Soviet union. 
Bukharin even described plans for arming and secretly 
training kulak cadres (in a manner similar to the White 
Guard movement) for actual behind-the-line fighting. 
As in the other trials, all the defendants 
took advantage of their right of last pleas. They each 
accepted full responsibility for criminal activity. But 
there was little of the sweeping plea for death which 
characterized the last pleas of de~endants in the earlier 
trials. Most of the accused made long speeches in which 
they qualified their crimes and stoutly argued on 
accusations which they were inclined to deny. 
The verdict was nevertheless severe: eighteen 
of the accused were condemned to be shot. Only Dr. D. D. 
Pletnev (sentenced to 25 years imprisonment); K. G. Rakovsky, 
(to 20 years), and S. A. Bessonov (15 years), escaped the 
death penalty. 
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This condensation of the action in the three 
famous Moscow treason trials has attempted to present 
only facts of an alleged conspiratoral movement as 
presented against the accused by Prosecutor Vyshinsky. 
Some of the debatable features of the testimony have 
been reserve~ for later discussion. 
What this chapter attempted was to show the 
circumstances under which certain evidence relating to 
Leon Trotsky was given. A study of this testimony 
necessarily -involves the background of the trials 
themselves--reaching as ~ar back even as the Red Revolution. 
Only one question of importance remains: that of the 
validity of the trials and of a bona fide Nazi-sponsored 
conspiracy. Since this problem is directly related to 
Trotsky and his son, Sedov, they will be treated later. 
In the three Moscow trials, 54 persons had been 
indicted and 47 had been executed. Other sources estimated 
that thousands of lesser figures during ~nese years- were 
rounded up and killed or exiled to Siberia. At any rate, 
by the end of 1938, on the eve of war in Europe, Stalin 
could boast to the world that there was no insidious internal 
foe in the Soviet Uhion--not even a feeble voice raised in 
opposition to his regime. Stalin now stood alone and 
supreme. If,-as some critics charged, this was his purpose 
from the beginning, he had fulfilled his plan to the letter. 
II. TROTSKY THE TRAITOR 
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II. TROTSKY THE TRAITOR 
The chie~ criminal on trial in Moscow, although 
he was not present, was Leon Trotsky. Whatever the 
connection of the accused with a foreign-supported con-
spiracy, Trotsky continually was pushed to the ~ore by 
Prosecutor Vyshinsky as the arch ~iend and plotter against 
the Soviet Union. 
Above and beyond the practical issues of the 
trials, however, rose a clear stream of argument which 
contrasted Socialism as Trotsky believed in it with 
Socialism as Stalin practiced it. R. T. Miller said 
one of the "most important aspects of the trials was the 
gradual emergence o~ Trotsky's theory that 'Socialism 
cannot be built in one country' as the real culprit and 
arch de~endant.1f Under Pros.ecutor Vyshinsky' s skill~ul 
hand this conception grew to ignominious stature and the 
program of Stalin received frequent, if subtle, praise. 
1. Stalin and Trotsky 
The polarity of the ideologies of Stalin and 
Trotsky was an ancient issue in the Soviet Union. Stalin's 
point of view had prevailed over Trotsky's as the national 
policy more than a decade before--winning such a total 
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triumph that there was no room left in the Soviet Union 
for Trotsky. But Trotsky continued an intensive literary 
attack upon Stalin from outside the Soviet Union. One of 
his best and clearest statements of his hatred for Stalin 
19 
is contained in his book, The Revolution Betrayed. It said: 
"The historian of the Soviet Union 
cannot fail to conclude that the policy of the 
ruling bureaucracy upon great questions has been 
a series of contradictory zigzags. The attempt 
to explain or justify them by 'changing circumstances' 
obviously won't hold water. To guide means at 
least in some degree to exercise foresight. The 
Stalin faction has not in the slightest degree 
foreseen the inevitable results of the development; 
they have been caugh~ napping every time. They 
have reacted with mere administrative reflexes. The 
theory of each successive turn has been created after 
the fact, and with small regard for what they were 
teaching yesterday. On the basis of the same irrefu-
table facts and documents, the historian will be com-
pelled to conclude that the so-called "Left Opposition" 
offered an immeasurably more correct analysis of the 
processes taking place in the country, and far more 
truly foresaw their further development. 
liThe bureaucracy conquered something more 
than the Left Opposition. It conquered the Bolshevik 
Party. It defeated the program of Lenin, who had . 
seen the chief danger in the conversion of the organs 
of the State "from servants of SOCiety to lords over 
society," It defeated all these enemies, the Opposi-
tion, the Party and Lenin, not with ideas and arguments, 
but with its own social weight. The leaden rump of 
the bureaucracy outweighed the head of the Revolution. tt 
Trotsky's theory of Socialism was primarily a 
concern in international politics. He favored allying the 
Soviet Union with labor parties and Governments in other 
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countries and taking care of domestic development as a· 
side function. Stalin, more in keeping with his lack of 
experience in world politics and travel abroad, was in-
clined to agree with the Soviet Premier Rykov, a Right 
Bolshevik, that the government must take account of the 
wishes of the governed. This meant immediate relief for 
problems confronting the peasants and workers. Trotsky 
was in ardent pursuit of the long-awaited, long-postponed 
world revolution; Stalin was prepared to soft-pedal the 
world revolution (at least, to postpone it still further) 
20 
in order to adopt a program of internal construction. 
Following the death of Lenin in 1924, Stalin and 
Trotsky were the two outstanding figures in the Politburo--
the nine-member all-powerful governing body of the Communist 
Party. A Marxist, but originally a Menshevik, Trotsky had 
been vice-president of the first soviet attempt in 1905. He 
then led the life of an exile in Europe and the United States 
until the March Revolution of 1917 made possible his return. 
During the first years of the Bolshevik regime he won 
distinction as Commissar of Foreign Affairs (where he forged 
the Brest-Litovsk treaty) and as an organizer of the Red Army 
to fight against White-guardists from his post as Commissar 
for War. 
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Stalin, a Georgian, was ·the very antithesis of 
the Jewish Trotsky. His first official post had been 
People's Commissar for Nationalities, a post in which he 
represented the minorities in Russian population. In 1923 
he was elected acting General Secretary of the Central 
Committee, in which post the strong hand fell to him at 
Lenin's death on January 21, 1924. He shared his power 
with two others: Trotsky's brother-in-law, Kamenev, and 
one of Kamenev's closest friends, Zinoviev. But the 
21 
driving force in this triumvirate was Stalin. 
Trotsky and Stalin clashed frequently in council 
meetings. Stalin did not harangue his colleagues; he 
carefully followed all that was said, and by the time that 
he summed up he was able to take his stand on ground where 
he knew he would be supported. Trotsky might make the 
moves and the mistakes, but Stalin would wait for him and. 
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outplay him. Lenin's opinion of both men is said to have 
been: UTrotsky, a kind of mountebank of whom you could 
never be certain; Stalin, one who might spoil everything 
23 
by his roughness. tt 
At the tenth Bolshevik Party Congress of March, 1921, 
the Central Committee headed by Lenin passed a resolution 
outlawing all factions in the Party as a menace to the unity 
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of the revolutionary leadership. It specifically warned 
"Comrade Trotsky" against IIfactional activities" and 
stated that "enemies of the state" were penetrating the 
24. 
Party and calling themselves "Trotskyites." 
With the exception of Lenin, no Russian was 
better known outside the Soviet Union than Trotsky. His 
international connections placed him on equal footing with 
Lenin whenever the Russian revolution was mentioned. 
The crushing blow to Trotsky's own ambitions 
came with Stalin's election to the secretaryship. Trotsky 
had to be satisfied with the smaller responsibility of 
Foreign Commissar. When the issue of a successor to Lenin 
faced the Party Congress in May, 1924, the 748 delegates 
voted unanimously to retain Stalin as General Secretary. 
The blunt repudiation of Trotsky caused even his erstwhile 
companions to vote against him. Bukharin, Zinoviev and 
Kamenev were compelled to side publicly with the majority. 
25 
Trotsky accused them of -betraying- him. 
Trotsky's close followers during this period 
(according to his own record and the testimony in the 
Moscow trials) included Yuri Pyatakov, radical son of a 
rich Ukranian family who had fallen under Trotsky's influence 
in Europe; Karl Radek, a Polish "leftist" journalist who 
became associated with Trotsky in Switzerland; Nicolai 
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Krestinsky and Grigori Sokolnikov, who entered the Soviet 
Foreign Office under Trotsky's auspices, -and Christian 
Rakovsky, a Bulgarian by birth, who had lived in most 
European countries and was the wealthy financial backer 
. 
of the Rumanian Socialists. An even closer group of 
associates surrounded Trotsky as a sort of vanguard. They 
included Nicolai Muralov, commander of the Moscow lfilitary 
garrison, Ivan Smirnov, Sergei }~achkovsky, Ephraim Dreitzer 
and~lumkin, the terrorist who murdered German Ambassador 
Mirbach. With the exception of Blumkin, all the above 
were defendants in the Moscow trials and their former 
association with Trotsky expressly recalled. 
After losing his bid for power in 1924, Trotsky 
jOined forces with Bukharin, who headed a group called 
"Left Communists" and Grigori Zinoviev, a leftist agitator 
who led his own group called ftZinovievites. iI This triO, 
together with Kamenev, formed the opposition deviation 
which both openly and secretly dissented from the majority 
line of the Party policy. 
In April, 1925, Trotsky went to the Caucasus for 
his political health and was removed from the key post of 
Commdssar for War, where he had gained influence with a 
number of key Army men. He was allowed to return to MOscow 
• 
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two months later and in December, 1925, he engaged in a 
stand-up fight ~ainst Stalin at the Party Congress. 
Stalin easily defeated Trotsky's candidates, Zinoviev 
and Kamenev by a vote of 559 to 65. Zinoviev, who had 
been a virtual dictator in Leningrad, w.s thus dethroned and 
his Leningrad leadership systematically smashed. 
In 1926 the struggle for world revolution was 
reaching the critical stage in other nations. A decade of 
"Red" scare had made revolution along Marxist lines impro-
bable in such countries as England, eventhough the labor 
movement was making strides. Stalin may have reasoned that 
abortive attempts at revolution abroad, in the face of 
failure, were p~omoting fascism. At any rate, he turned 
to home construction and soon initiated the first five-year 
plan. Trotsky continued to stand for Bolshevik orthodoxy 
and claimed priority for the world revolution. Zinoviev and 
Kamenev, while primarily internationally-minaed" lIke Tr6tskY. 
employed different tactics. They played the role of opportun-
ists, cringing and apologizing when rebuked, only to start 
their factional activities over again. 
The true picture of internal dissension in the 
Communist Party from 1924 to 1927 is not wholly clear. For 
a long time the Party seemed unwilling to display its dirty 
linen outside its ranks. The Bolsheviks reasoned that they 
were few enough in a hostikworld and could ill afford to be 
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seen quarreling among themselves. One co~mentator described 
this period as three years of "incessant public controversy. 
This took various forms. There were repeated debates in the 
principal legislative organs, such as the Central Executive 
Commdttee of the All-Union Congress of Soviets ••• There were 
hot arguments in many of the local soviets ••• There was a vast 
(oppositionist) literature of books and pamphlets, not stopped 
by censorship, and published, indeed, by the state publishing 
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houses." 
In his autobiography, ~ Life, Trotsky describes the 
working of his oppositionist movement, including the well-known 
system of "fives t ', sometimes called "cells n • He watched his 
secret following grow until, by the fall of 1927, he was 
willing to risk his bid for power in an all-out demonstration. 
He planned a demonstration to coincide with the tenth 
anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution on November 7. As 
workers marched through the streets of Eoscow that holiday 
morning, Trotsky's propaganda leaflets showered down on them 
from high buildings. Small bands of Trotskyites soon appeared 
in the streets waving banners and placards. Stalin's forces 
moved swiftly to enforce the long-neglected law against 
factional activity. Muralov, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Dreitzer, 
Kamenev, Pyatakov, Zinoviev, Radek and Trotsky himself were 
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placed under arrest. At the Party Congress the following 
month they were expelled from the Bolshevik Party and those 
who did not publicly recant were sent into exile. Trotsky 
was sent to Alma Ata, capital of the Kazakh Soviet Republic 
in Siberia, near the border of China. Bukharin, who had 
wisely refused to take part in Trotsky's putsch, went 
quietly about the formulation of a new opposition movement, 
which became publicly known as the Right Opposition. 
Unable to stop Trotsky's opposition work even in 
Siberia, Stalin's secret police escorted Trotsky to the 
western frontier on January 22, 1929, and pushed him across. 
He left Russia, never to return, still shouting that he 
wanted it recorded that he left against his will. 
Having disposed of the Lefts, Stalin set about to 
eliminate all factions opposing his leadership. He soon 
dealt a death blow to the Rights--Bukharin, Rykov and 
Tomsky--letting them know that they were not powerful enough 
to fight on equal terms against him. . At the beginning of 
1929, Bukharin, author of the ABC'S Qf Communism, and Tomsky, 
head of the Trade Unions, demanded Stalin's reSignation, but 
the event was saved from a public showdown. Stalin stood 
alone among the leaders of the Party and he seemingly had the 
masses of the Party's rank and file solidly behind him. 
One year later, the other Right leader, Rykov, was replaced 
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as premier by Stalin's most devoted follower and friend, 
27 
Molotov. 
2. High Treason 
Chronologically, Trotsky's arrival at Constanti-
nople from Russia should mark the beginning of the era of 
political double-dealing and treason with which the Moscow 
trials deal. But two stories of treasonable activities 
. ante-dat~ his banishment. At the third :Moscow trial, 
Trotsky's old-time associate, Nicolai Krestinsky, confessed 
that Trotsky had made a deal with the military intelligence 
of the German Reichswehr as early as 1922. In return for 
250,000 gold marks annually he promised to supply the 
Germans with military information about the Red Army. He 
planned to use the money to support his opposition forces. 
Krestinsky said that he had completed the deal for Trotsky 
with German General Hans von Seeckt, commander of the 
Reichswehr, while serving in the Russian embassy in Berlin 
in 1922. The payments continued without interruption, he 
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said, until he left Berlin in 1930. 
"The monetary subsidy was paid in regular 
installments several times a year, mostly in Moscow, 
but sometimes in Berlin. 
"If for some reason the money was not paid 
in vroscow, I rec ei ved it in Berlin myself' directly 
f'rom General Seeckt; and I used to take it to Moscow 
myself' and l!and it to Trotsky."--Krestinsky. 
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The third trial also revealed how Trotsky was 
able to continue a widespread secret correspondence with 
his sympathizers during his exile at Alma Ata. The 
Government, aware of what he was doing, warned him that his 
activity was seditious and must be ended. His refusal 
led to his later banishment. What made possible this 
activity, as the third trial showed, was the kindly treatment 
accorded him by the Assistant head of the secret police, 
Yagoda. Yagoda confessed that he had decided to be on the 
winning side in the struggle and he made things easier 
for Trotsky in belief that he would eventually wrest power 
29 
from Stalin. Trotsky boastfully describes the methods 
of secret correspondence from Alma Ata in his autobiography. 
He also told the inquiry group in Mexico that he wrote 




Trotsky's presence in Turkey caused an internal 
political storm. The Turkish Government fihally settled 
by giving Trotsky a haven on the island of Prinkipo. The 
liberal German writer, Emil Ludwig, who interviewed Trotsky 
at Prinkipo, asked him how large was his following in 
Russia. His reply: If It is difficult to estimate ••• scattered 
••• underground. When an opportunity is presented from the 
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outside ••• perhaps a war or a new European intervention 
--when the weakness of the Government would act as a 
stimulus," that, said Trotsky, would be the signal for 
31 
him to come into the open again. 
John Gunther in his interview entitled Trotsky 
~ Elba said that Trotsky had "lost Russia, or at least 
. 
for a while ••• His chief aim is to hold out, to hope for 
Stalin's downfall in Russia, and meantime to bend every 
bit of energy to unceasing perfection of his counter-
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Communist organization abroad. 1f 
The main exercise of Trotsky's life in exile 
seems to have been his extensive literary attack upon 
Stalin. He employed a large staff of secretaries and 
helpers, writing books, articles and publishing a regular 
paper which set forth the thesis that Stalin had tfbetrayed 
the purpose of the revolution. 1I His work readily found 
space in European and American magazines and newspapers • 
. 
His first book, the autobiography, appeared originally as 
a series of anti-Soviet articles in newspapers of Europe. 
Other books followed in rapid succession: Soviet Economy 
in Danger, The Revolution Betrayed, The Failure ~ the 
~ ~ Plan, Stalin and the Chinese Revolution, ~ 
Stalin School 2! Falsification and others. His regular 
journalistic efforts were incorporated in the Bulletin 
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of the Opposition, which Trotsky testified was smuggled 
into Russia by secret Trotskyite centers for distribution. 
Prosecutor Vyshinsky took note of Trotsky's 
literary attack during the course of the Moscow trials. 
Vyshinsky said anti-Soviet writers and politicians had 
served to intensify the antipathy toward and mistrust of 
the Soviet Union. They had added to the growing fear of 
a ttBolshevik menace" and this fear, in turn, was helping 
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to produce fascism in Europe. 
3. Vyshinsky's Case 
Before Hitler's rise to power, Trotsky's son, 
Sedov, took an apartment in Berlin. Another representative 
of Trotsky in Berlin was Krestinsky, who was still attached 
to the Russian embassy there. In 1930, however, Krestinsky 
was made Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs and returned 
to Moscow. Sedov's presence in Berlin, therefore, was 
necessary to continue Trotsky's long-standing contact with 
the Reichswehr (according to the evidence of the third trial). 
Trotsky said of his son's presence in Berlin: 
tlLeon was al~ays on the lookout ••• Avidly searching for 
connecting threads with Russia, hunting up returning tourists, 
Soviet students, assigned abroad, or sympathetic functionaries 
in the foreign representatio~. To avoid compromising his 
informant ••• and to evade the GPU spies, he would chase for 
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hours through the streets of Berlin. tf 
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I. N. Smirnov, a defendant in the first trial 
and one-time Red Army officer who had denounced Trotsky 
after being sent into exile and later pleaded for readmiss-
ion to the Party, came to Berlin in 1931 as a consulting 
engineer on a trade mission. Smirnov's confession stated 
that he met Sedov in Berlin and learned of Trotsky's plans 
for an all-out offensive against Stalin. Smirnov protested 
vainly during the August, 1936, trial that he had not engaged 
in ~errorism, but repeatedly admitted that he had brought 
Trotsky's instructions from Sedov urging a united front of 
all opposition groups in the Soviet Union and a campaign 
with a primarily militant character. Smirnov was to arrange 
also for messengers to bring news regularly to Sedov in 
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Berlin. 
While in Berlin, Smirnov hunted up another of 
Trotsky's old friends, Yuri Pyatakov, who had renounced 
his allegiance to Trotsky after the abortive 1927 putsch 
and gradually won his way back into the Party. He was 
stationed in Berlin as head of a Soviet Trade Mission. 
Here is part of Pyatakov's account of his meeting with 
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Sedov: 
" ••• Sedov said that Trotsky had not for 
a moment abandoned the idea of resuming the fight 
against Stalin's leadership; that there had been 
a temporary lull owing partly to Trotsky's repeated 
movements from one country to another, but that 
tpis struggle was now being resumed, of which he, 
Trotsky, was hereby informing me ••• After this, 
Sedov asked me pointblank: 'Trotsky asks, do you, 
Pyatakov, intend to lend a hand in this fight?' 
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I gave my consent •••• Sedov went on to outline the 
nature of the new methods of struggle: there eould 
be no question of developing a mass movement; if we 
adopted any kind of mass work we would come to grief 
immediately; Trotsky was firmly in favor of the 
forcible overthrow of the Stalin leadership by 
methods of terrorism and wrecking •••• " 
In his position as a trade commission executive, 
Pyatakov was also asked by Sedov to help provide funds for 
Trotsky's work. Pyatakov confessed that he did so by 
several methods of subterfuge. One of these was described 
by an American engineer, John D. Littlepage, who was employed 
at this time for some work by the Soviet Government. In 
an article in the Saturday Evening Post in 1938 he said that 
Pyatakov negotiated a contract with a Berlin manufacturing 
concern, Borsig and Demag, in which cast bases were substi-
tuted for light steel as called for in the contract, thus 
raising the price per pound, but making it possible for the 
firm to make a substantial refund to Pyatakov which he in 
turn could give to Trotsky. Littlepage also tells of 
observing sabotage work in mines of southern Kazakstan which 
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were conducted on Pyatakov's personal instructions. 
Trotsky I s messages and instruct·ions began spreading 
through the seething underground oppositionists all through 
the year 1932. Among some of the old Trotskyites the new 
line proved alarming. The journalist, Karl Radek, was 
near panic until a letter from Trotsky in February, 1932, 
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told him that the struggle had reached a new phase in 
which "we shall be destroyed together with the Soviet Union, 
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or we must raise the question of removing the leadership." 
Thus, the question of terrorism was one of the 
cardinal decisions taken by the Trotskyite centers. The 
conspiracy began taking the form of small, independent 
terrorist groups. Smirnov's was the first and most active. 
It contained two of Trotsky's old comrades, Serge Y~achkov­
sky and Ephraim Dreitzer. They allegedly organized small 
cells of professional gunmen, according to their confessions, 
while pyatakov was seeking out other conspirators to conduct 
an all-out sabotage campaign. The terrorists made up one 
layer of the plot--the layer Vyshinsky claimed to have laid 
bare in the first treason trial of August, 1936. Pyatakov's 
Qrganization was the second, not too closely connected with 
the terrorists. It was smashed by the second trial. 
The most important layer of the conspiracy was the 
one uncovered by the third trial (March, 1938). It consisted 
of a few choice persons in the Red Army, Krestinsky and 
Sokolnikov (for the Trotskyites) and Bukharin and Rykov 
(from the Rights). This group, highly secret, was the nucleus 
o~ tfie new Government which Trotsky intended to bring to 
power with the aid of German and Japan attacks upon Russia. 
They were the foundation of the conspiracy. 
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According to Krestinsky's confession, he met 
Trotsky at Merano, a health resort in the Italian Tyrol, 
in October, 1933, and there it was decided to extend the 
existing agreement with the Reichswehr (the one made in 
1922) into a .wide agreement which would amount to an 
alliance of designs against the Soviet Union. 
Trotsky's reasoning, Krestinsky said, was that 
Hitler was attempting to penetrate the Reichswehr and that 
it might be possible to come to terms with the German 
Government as well. Another conclusion was that: "We 
were receiving a small sum of money from the Reichswehr 
and they were receiving espionage info~mation which they 
would need during an armed attack. But the German Govern-
ment, Hitler particularly, wanted colonies, territory, not 
just information. Trotsky said Hitler was prepared to 
settle for Soviet territory instead of colonies for which 
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he would have to fight England. tf 
Trotsky saw in this situation a basis for making 
a deal with Hitler by which he would come to power in a 
smaller Soviet state while Hitler would get the Ukraine. 
"As for us, If Trotsky allegedly told Krestinsky, tfwe do not 
need the 250,000 gold marks, we need German armed forces in 
order to come to power." Krestinsky said Trotsky then 
described the possible aid which a strong united opposition 
inside the Soviet Union might contribute to insure a German 
victory in war. Trotsky's instructions were for consolidation 
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of Trotskyite forces with the Rights and he s~ested the 
name of Tukhachevsky as the man to head the military part 
of the conspiracy. Lastly, Trotsky told Krestinsky of the 
necessity for an agreement with the Japanese and mentioned 
Sokolnikov, then working in the People's Commissariat of 
Foreign A~fairs, as the logical person to conduct such 
negotiations. 
That Trotsky did make an agreement with the Nazis 
was the startling revelation made by pyatakov and Radek in 
the second trial. Pyatakov said he made a secret airplane 
trip from Berlin to Oslo in 1936 to see Trotsky--a meeting 
which Trotsky denied ever took place. He said Trotsky had 
40 
concluded a five-point agreement with Rudolph Hess: 
1. To guarantee a generally favorable 
attitude toward ~ermany and necessary collabora-
tion in important international questions. 
2. To agree to territorial concessions 
(the Ukraine). 
3. To grant concessions to German 
industrialists-
4. To create favorable conditions in the 
U.S.S.R. for private "German enterprise. 
5. To develop extensive diversive activi-
ties in war industries and at the front in event 
of a German attack upon Russia. 
All this Trotsky allegedly promised in return for German 
aid in restoring him to power in Russia. 
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Radek collaborated Pyatakov's tale of a visit 
to Oslo and the secret agreement with Germany. Radek said 
he at one time talked to a military representative of 
Germany who informed him of the agreement between Trotsky 
and Rudolph Hess regarding concessions Trotsky would make 
to the Nazis if he were returned to power in Russia. He 
also described a conversation he had with Pyatakov after 
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the latter's return from his visit with Trotsky in 1936: 
"VYSHINSKY: Did you ever speak to Pyatakov, 
or with someone else, about the date when the possible 
war would approach? 
RADEK: When Pyatakov returned from Oslo, I 
put a number of questions to him concerning foreign 
policy. He informed me that Trotsky had told him 
it was not a matter of a five-year period, not of 
one year or two years at the most. It was a matter of 
war in 1937. When I asked Pyatakov: 'Did Trotsky 
tell you this as his own assumption?' Pyatakov replied: 
'No, Trotsky said that he had got this in his conversa-
tion with Hess and other semi-official persons in 
Germany with whom.he had dealings.tI 
Both Radek and Pyatakov said Trotsky appeared 
willing to guarantee to the Germans complete freedom for an 
advance into the Balkan and Danube countries. The plans for 
war in 1937 were contingent upon diplomatic negotiations to 
secure British neutrality and to build up the growing 
fascist following in France so that an agreement could be 
made or a swift blow struck to ~ut France out of action. 
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Several lesser personalities among the accused 
at Moscow testified to direct association with Trotsky 
or his son. Ephraim Dreitzer, defendant with Smirnov in 
the first trial, said he had two meetings with L. Sedov 
in a cafe in Leipziger Strasse in Berlin in the autumn of 
1931. He was told by Sedov that instructions would be 
sent him from Trotsky later. The letter came in invisible 
ink via a German cinema magazine nearly three years later. 
It urged speeding of plans to assassinate Stalin and Voro-
shilov. Mrachkovsky, who collaborated Dreitzer's words, 
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said he read the letter before it was burned. 
V. Olberg, another first-trial defendant, said 
he was sent to Russia by Sedov on a false passport which 
Sedov secured from a Nazi agent. Olberg said he was living 
in Berlin from May, 1931, until the end of 1932 and met 
Sedov there "nearly every week, and sometimes twice a week." 
Late in 1932, when Leon Trotsky was stopping in Copenhagen 
enroute to Norway, Olberg said he planned to make a visit 
to Trotsky along with Sedov. ftOur trip did not materialize," 
he testified, "but Suzanna, Sedov's wife, went to Copenhagen. 
On her return she brought a letter from Trotsky addressed to 
Sedov, in which Trotsky agreed to my going to the U.S.S.R. 
and expressed hope that I would succeed in carrying out the 
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mission entrusted to me. Sedov showed me this letter." 
E. S. Holtzman, who followed Olberg on the stand, 
said he was also in Berlin at the time Sedov proposed to 
make a trip to Copenhagen to see his father. His testimony 
contrasts with Olberg's when he states that both he and 
Sedov made such a trip. Holtzman said he met Sedov in 
Berlin after bringing a message from Smirnov and identify-
ing himself over the telephone with the secret password: 
If I have brought greetings from Galya." Holtzman said he 
wanted to see Trotsky and prevailed upon Sedov to let him 
go with him to Copenhagen. 
ItI told Sedov that we could not go 
together for reasons of secrecy. I arranged 
with Sedov to be in Copenhagen within two or 
three days, to put up at the Hotel Bristol 
and meet him there. I went to the hotel 
straight from the station and in the lounge 
met Sedov. 
"About 10 a.m. we went to Trotsky ••• 
I told him that I intended to leave Copenhagen 
that day and would leave for the U.S.S.R. 
within several days. Then Trotsky, walking up 
and down the room in a rather excited state, told 
me that he was preparing a letter for Smirnov, 
but as I was leaving that day he would not write 
it. I must say that throughout this conversation 
I was alone with Trotsky. Very often Trotsky's 
son, Sedov, came in and out of the room. It 
There is an obvious discrepancy between the 
accouhts of Olberg and Holtzman which escaped the attention 
Prosecutor Vyshinsky and waS incorporated in the official 
record of proceedings. Trotsky attempted to use this 
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discrepancy as proof that both men were lying, since their 
stories were pure fabrication. 
K. B. Bermin-Yurin, accused in the ~irst trial, 
also confessed to a conversation with Trotsky in Copenhagen 
at the end of 1932 in which Trotsky commissioned him to 
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carry out an assassination plot against Stalin. 
flHe said the act should, if possible, 
be timed to take place at a plenum or at the 
congress of the Comintern, so that the shot at 
Stalin would ring out in a large assembly. 
This would have a tremendous repercussion far 
beyond the borders of the· Soviet Union and would 
give rise to a mass movement allover the world. 
This would be an historical political event of 
world significance. Trotsky said that I should 
carryon the work independently. I replied that 
I did not know anybody in Moscow •••• I said that 
I had an acquaince in Copenhagen ~amed Fritz 
David, and asked whether I might not get in 
touch with him." 
Fritz David, another defendant, admitted that 
he was instructed in Copenhagen by Trotsky to work out 
an assassination plot against Stalin with Bermin-Yurin. 
Two other Moscow trial defendants confessed 
to direct contact with Sedov. They were Alexei Shestov, 
an engineer on Pyatakovts trade mission, and Sergei 
Bessonov, a member of the Berlin Trade Representation 
of the U.S.S.R. Bessonov confessed that he became a 
Ifliaison point" between the Russian Trotskyites and Sedov. 
Shestov,;: 
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Shestov later returned to Russia with pyatakov and was 
appointed by him to organize espionage and sabotage acts 
in Siberia mines and railroads. Shestov confessed that 
Trotskyites, aided by German espionage experts, conducted 
extensive sabotage activity. 
The foregoing is Prosecutor Vyshinsky's case 
against Leon Trotsky, told as summarily and dispassionately 
as possible. Trotsky had his inning in 1938 and what he 
said in rebuttal is the subject of the next section. 
III. TROTSKY TESTIFIES 
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III. TROTSKY TESTIFIES 
In 1932 Tro"t.'3ky was granted a visa for a visit 
to France. He left Turkey, spent several weeks in France 
and then left for the new haven which had been offered 
him in Oslo. Enroute to Oslo he stopped for a speaking 
engagement and broadcast to the United States at 
Copenhagen. Four years later he was forced to leave 
Norway and Mexico then offered him ref~e. He arrived 
in Mexico on January 13, 1937 and set up headquarters 
at a private villa in Coyoacan. 
From the safety of his American ref~e, Trotsky 
continued to pour out a steady stream of words against 
the Stalin ffbureaucracylt. In December, 1937, an article 
bearing Trotsky's name appeared in the Hearst Press. It 
stated that Stalin was so firmly seated at the helm of 
the Soviet state that the only way to remove him flis by 
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assassination. II Trotsky later protested that the article 
was a forgery. 
In the Uhited States, an American Committee for 
the Defense of Leon Trotsky was organized due largely to 
the work of anti-Soviet sympathizers. Its sponsors 
persuaded prominent personalities to join the crusade under 
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the humanitarian purpose of giving Trotsky a reasonable 
sounding-board for his defense. The most famous of these 
persohalities was Dr. John Dewey, who agreed to head a 
preliminary commission of inquiry to receive testimony 
from Leon Trotsky in Mexico. The hearings opened on 
April 10, 1938. 
Purpose of the commission was set forth by 
Dewey in his opening statement: "To give Trotsky an 
opportunity to give his side of the case, since he was 
condemned by the Soviet Supreme Court without benefit 
of a trial. (From the C~se Qf Leon Trotsky, page 3). 
The verdict of the commission was announced 
seven months later after further hearings in New York 
and Paris (Sedov was in Paris at the time). Dewey 
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analyzed the verdict in these words: 
".ASa result of its prolonged, thorough 
and impartial investigation--for none of its ten 
members is a Trotskyite or affiliated in any way 
with his theories and activities--it (the 
cownission) found Trotsky and his son innocent of 
the charges brought against them. 
" •••• We found that Trotsky never in-
structed the witnesses or any of the other accused 
in the Moscow trials to engage in sabotage or to 
enter into agreements with foreign powers against 
the Soviet TJhion. On the basis of all the evi-
dence, we found that Trotsky never recommended, 
plotted, or attempted the restoration of capitalism 
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in the U.S.S.R. It was clearly established that 
the prosecutor at the trials, fantastically 
falsified Trotsky's role, before, during, and after 
the October Revolution. In short, the commission's 
report proves the Moscow trials to be a frame-up." 
Members of the commission in Mexico had been 
Carleton Beals, author; Otto Ruehle, a former Socialist 
member of the German Reichstag; Benjamin Stolberg, 
journalist, and Suzanne La Follette, an anti-Soviet writer. 
Questioning attorney was Albert Goldman, Trotsky's 
American lawyer. In his opening statement, Goldman argued 
that the testimony to follow would show Trotsky's 
iilnocence tfbeyond all doubt," despite the virtually 
impossible task of proving a negatige proposition. He 
proceeded by taking up the testimony of the Moscow trials 
bit by bit. 
A careful reading of Trotsky's testimony throw. 
some legitimate doubt upon some of the minor facts 
confessed by the defendants at the Moscow trials. But, 
for the most part, his arguments about evidence was confined 
to squibbling over minor parts. He notes the disparity 
in the stories of Olberg and Bermin-Yurin and Holtsman 
and summarily argues that the accused were acting out 
roles of a fictitious plot authored by Soviet authorities. 
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Trotsky's testimony fell on two planes. On one 
squibbled over small details. On the higher plane he 
attempted to prove by his voluminous writings that his 
philosophy of Socialism was so antithetic to fascism that 
it would have been unthinkable for him to deal with Hitler. 
Between these planes Trotsky tells the story of his life 
in graphic detail and his role as the hero of the revolution 
does not sutfer in the telling. He accuses Stalin of trying 
to distort the true story of Trotsky's participation in the 
early days of the Party and the revolution. 
But Trotsky does not go so tar as to deny that 
there was no anti-Soviet conspiracy in the Soviet union. 
Since he had been away from 1929 on, he had no way of 
knowing what the accused had been doing. Taking up the 
list of the accused, name gy name, he denied that he was 
even remotely connected with any of them after the 1927 
demonstration when they all denounced him and recanted. 
Goldman told the commission that they could find Trotsky 
innocent without making the assertion that the Moscow 
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trials were a frame-up. 
At least one member of the cOH~ission failed to 
sympathize with Trotsky's story. At the end of the fif-th 
day, Carleton Beals handed in his resignation: 
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tfThe important purpose, among others, 
for which I became a member of the commission, 
namely: to give Mr. Trotsky the opportuhity 
which every accused person should have, to 
present his full case to the world, has been 
fulfilled to the extent possible with the 
present arrangements. unfortunately, I do not 
consider the proceedings of the commission a 
truly serious investigation of the charges. tI 
--Page 417 
A public statement by Beals the next.day asserted 
in part: "The hushed adoration of the other members of the 
committee for Mr. Trotsky throughout the hearings has 
defeated all spirit of honest investigation .... The very first 
day I was told my questions were improper ••• The cross-exami-
nation consisted of allowing Trotsky to spout propaganda 
charges with eloquence and wild denunciations, with only 
rare efforts to make him prove his assertions ••• The commission 
may pass its bad check on the public if it desires, but I 
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will not lend my name ••• " 
Typical of the eloquent harangues with which Trotsky 
assailed Stalin and defended his own philosophy is this section 
of his summary statement before the inquiry commission: 
Uln the years from 1923 to 1933 with 
respect to the Soviet state, its leading Party and 
the Communist International, I held the view expressed 
in those chiseled words: Reform, but not Revolution ••• 
I have defended the raising of the living standard of 
the masses against excessive privileges at the top; 
systematic industrialization and collectivization in the 
interests of the toilers; finally, internationalism 
against nationalist conservatism. I have attempted 
to explain theoretically why the isolation of the 
Soviet state, on the basis of a backward economy, 
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has extruded the monstrous pyramid of the bureaucracy, 
which has almost automatically been crowned by an 
uncontrolled and "infallible ff leader. 
tt •••• The Moscow authorities did not indict 
me in a single one of the trials. And that is, of 
course, not accidental. To indict me they would have 
had to summon me before the court, or to demand my 
extradition. For this purpose they would have had to 
announce the date of the trial, and to publish the 
indictment at least some weeks before the opening of 
the court proceedings. But Moscow could not even go 
that far •••• They could have asked my extradition only 
by opening the question in a French, Norwegian or 
N~xican court, before the eyes of the world press. 
But that would have meant for the Kremlin to court a 
cruel failure! For this very reason, the two trials 
were not a prosecution of myself and my son, but only 
a slander against us, carried out by means of a legal 
process, without notification, without summons, behind 
our backs.t! (Page 475) 
Trotsky argued that none of the crimes on which 
the accused were indicted at Moscow would have been advan-
tageous to the Opposition, but conversely would have served 
the GPU as a starting-point to extract confessions from 
political opponents. He cited the murder of Kirov as 
meaningless politically, but claimed that it was engineered 
by the GPU. Actually, the third trial revealed that the 
GPU was involved in the Kirov assassination. 
Trotsky makes much of such points as the omission 
of Molotov's name from the list of those scheduled to be 
executed by terrorists despite his high political post. 
He said there were persistent rumors of friction between 
Stalin and Molotov in 1936 and Stalin did not propose to 
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to lend any extra prestige to Molotov by including him 
on the agenda of near martyrs. However, MOlotov's name 
does appear among those planned for assassination in the 
testimony of the second trial and Trotsky argued that 
this indicated that Stalin and Molotov had patched up 
their differences. 
Trotsky scoffed at the sabotage charges made 
against the accused in the second trial: 
tiThe crudest part of the j udic ial 
frame-up, alike in design and execution, is the 
charge of sabotage against Trotskyites. This 
aspect of the trial, which constitutes one of the 
most important elements of the whole amalgam, 
has convinced nobody. The world learned, from 
the indictment and the proceedings, that all 
Soviet industry was virtually in the control of 
a 'handful of Trotskyites' •••• Of what did the acts 
of sabotage really consist? In Pyatakov's confession 
it was revealed that: (a) Plans for new factories 
were too slowly drafted, and revised time and again; 
(b) the construction of factories took far too long, 
and caused the immobilization of collosal sums; 
(c) enterprises were put into operation in an 
unfinished state; (d) there were disproportions 
among the various sections of new plants, with the 
result that the productive capacity of the factories 
was reduced in the extremes; (e) the plants accumulated 
superfluous reserves of raw materials, etc. etc •••• " 
--(Page 503-504) 
Trotsky also made much of the discrepancy between 
the testimony of V. Olberg and E. S. Holtzman, one of whom 
said Sedov made a trip from Berlin to Copenhagen to see 
Trotsky and the other said the trip did not materialize. 
He also denied that Pyatakov made a flight to Oslo in 1936 
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and produced an affidavit from Oslo airport officials 
stating that no German plane landed at Oslo within six 
months of the time when the visit allegedly was made-
The whole of the second trial's validity is 
disposed of in Trotsky's reasoning by Vyshinsky's failure 
to substantiate beyond doubt the confessions of Pyatakov 
and Radek. ttThe function of Radek and Pyatakov was to 
demonstrate the direct connection between the criminals 
and myself," Trotsky declared. "'All the testimony of 
the other accused rests on our testimony,' Radek confesses. 
In other words, it rests upon nothing. It has crumbled 
into dust. It is hardly necessary to demolish a building 
brick by brick, once the two basic columns on which it 
rests are thrown down. Messrs. Accusers, crawl on your 
bellies in the wreckage and gather up the chips of your 
masonry." (Page 570) 
In the course of the Mexico proceedings, Trotsky 
introduced innumerable documents as evidence, including 
most of the "more than 5,000 printed pages written by me 
since I left the Soviet Union. tI 
It is hardly worthwhile to quote the numerous 
charges hurled against the validity of the Moscow trials 
by British and American critics. They are based primarily 
upon conjecture and were inspired for the most part by 
long-time prejudices and antipathies. The information 
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of "General If Krivitsky, who claimed to have been at one 
time an important member of the Russian secret police, 
is untrustworthy (eventhough given before the House 
Committee on Unamerican Activity) because he later 
admitted that much of what he had said was pure fabrica-
tion. 
One of the more credible bits of evidence in 
Trotsky's behalf was contained in a series of articles 
appearing in the ~ ~ Times in December, 1937. They 
were written by Alexander Barmine, who asserted that 
"these trials have been prepared for the extermination 
en masse of those of the Communist Party in Russia who 
carried on the struggle for freedom, wrought the revolution, 
fought the civil war, and assured the victory of the 
60 
workers' State. tt 
Barmine's story carries weight because he quit 
his post as Charge d'Affaires at Athens when he became 
afraid that Stalin was preparing to include him in the 
list of Soviet Foreign Office leaders scheduled to be 
exterminated. He described the "purge l1 of the Foreign 
Office as follows: 
"Litvinov was my chief •••• Litvinov is 
still there, titular head of the Foreign Service. 
But of his three under-secretaries, Gregory 
Sokolnikov is in prison, Karakhan was executed 
and Nicolai Krestinsky disappeared. 
-67-
·Of his ambassadors and ministers only 
three remain--Ivan M. Maisky in London, Jacob 
Surita in Paris, and Alexander A. Troyanovsky in, 
Washington. It is a curious fact that all three 
came to the Bolshevik side after the revolution 
had been victorious •••• 
"He (Litvinov) was in time past a 
courageous revolutionary who had Lenin's confi-
dence •••• What tragiC fate has overtaken him to 
see his best collaborators, his closest friends, 
disappear--to see the whole fra~mework of his 
service broken and to be obliged now to approve 
what has been done, even to praising the execu-
tioners of his associates. 1I (51) 
Barmine said he came to his conclusions about 
Stalin quite reluctantly and even tried to justify 
Stalin for the £irst trial. But, he wrote, the further 
Stalin went with his accusatiofis, the more absurd the 
whole thing became. His particular distrust of Stalin 
is demonstrated in the following story which I have been 
unable to corroborate with Qther material. 
"Bukharin antiCipated his fate 
probably before the others of the Old Guard. 
At his last meeting with Kamenev, before the 
latter was arrested, he said: 'we are all 
lost. This monster, this sinister Genghis Khan, 
will strangle us. If we resist he will crush us. If 
we submit he will pick us off one after another.' 
ttThat prophecy has proved only too true. 
Bukharin was dismassed from the post of director 
of Izvestia and arrested with Rykov some days after 
the trial of Pyatakov and Karl Radek. As they were 
still members of the central committee of the Party, 
Bukharin and Rykov were called before a full meeting 
last February (1937). They refused in spite of 
pressure to confess the absurd crimes that were 
imputed to them. 
"It is said that at the close of the 
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meeting, which was fierce and noisy, Rykov 
broke down and wept. Bukharin not only defended 
himself, he accused. For a few minutes he 
seemed about to carry the meeting with him 
when Stalin shouted: 'Take them back to prisont 
Let them defend themselves there1'u (52) 
Trotsky's testialony was petty, though quite 
extensive. His literary supporters, for the most part, 
were non-authoritative and typical propagandists. But 
Barmine's words appeared to incorporate in essence what 
countless less authoritative writers said in a flood of 
articles, books and pamphlets. 
"Those who seek to understand all this tremendous 
drama," Barmine concluded, ushould never forget that Stalin 
has an Asiatic mind. He has never been outside Russia. 
These others whom he destroyed were men of wider 
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experience and view than he and as such were inimical. 1t 
IV. TRAIL TO TRUTH 
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IV. TRAIL TO TRUTH 
Oddly enough, some of the most reasonable doubt 
on the validity of the trials arises in contemplation on 
some of the salient features of the investigation proceed-
ures of the prosecution. Trotsky mentioned some of these 
arguments in his testimony, but they were more fully 
expounded by other writers. 
To the Western mind, the most remarkable part 
of the whole thing is that the trials should have been 
held at all. In view of the fact that all the accused 
had confessed before they were ever brought to trial, all 
that would have been necessary under an American or 
English court would be the reading of the indic~ment, a 
formal plea of guilty and the passing of sentences. 
As both Trotsky and Barmine noted, the trials 
were primarily a propaganda agency for demonstrating that 
Stalin was on the job in defending the workers' cause 
against all enemies. Had the accused been tried in closed 
court and shot, the noisy cry of tfpurge tt which followed 
the trials might have been heard loudest inside the Soviet 
Union. Under the circumstances, several reasons suggest 
themselves for the holding of the trials. First of all, 
the accused included men of such political prominence and 
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influence that only their own words in open court would 
have been ~ufficient to convince the whole Russian popu-
lace that they were guilty to treason. There is also 
the possibility that the Soviet regime was attempting to 
sound a warning to all would-be conspirators, high and 
low, that they could not escape. 
On the basis of the official records of the 
court proceedings, the trials are a curious phenomenon 
to Western readers. There is little of the careful 
pyramiding of evidence, the pains-taking building of a 
case, so typical of American courts. Most of the 
testimony occurs with the assumption of numerous facts 
contained in the volumes of unpublished testimony on 
the prosecutor's desk. Joseph Davies said "there is 
little in the Russian criminal proceedure, as represented 
in the official reports of the first two trials, that 
indicates their·primary purpose was to ascertain the 
truth. An American, perhaps, can be excused from such a 
harsh judgment if one considers that he is likely to be 
predisposed to judge adversely because of the differences 
in court proceedure. A perusal of the two trial proceed-
ings, nevertheless, leave the definite impression that 
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the trials leave more unsaid than has actually been said. n 
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The Russian criminal proceedure is not without 
its admirers among westerners, however. The correspondent 
Miller says that "fullest examination of the accused is 
made before a case comes to trial. The most familiar 
and conspicuous features of the British and Arnerican 
trial, cross-examination and taking of evidence, occurs 
here--as in most European countries--before any court 
proceedings take place. Cases are usually not tried 
unless or until the Prosecutor has obtained enough evidence 
to make a conviction reasonably certain •••• But whereas a 
plea. of guilty in English Common Law requires only a 
brief statement from the prisoner before sentence is 
passed, in Russia the prosecutor must prove his whole 
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case in court." It is hardly necessary to add that 
Miller's admiration of the Soviet regime is virtually 
unqualified. 
1. The Confessions 
The most pertinent question connected with the 
validity of the evidence produced by Vyshinsky hinges on 
the question of how he was able to obtain such abject 
confeSSions, and having persuaded the accused to confess, 
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whether or not the confessions were confined strictly to 
the truth. Trotsky did not presume to explain or discuss 
the practical side of' the conf'essions. trWhy did the 
accused, after twenty-five, thirty, or more years or 
revolutionary work, agree to take upon themselves such 
monstrous and degrading accusations? How did the GPU 
achieve this? Why did not a single one of the accused 
cry out openly before the court against the frame-up? 
In the nature of the case, I am not obliged to answer 
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these questions." He probably did not know the answers 
and hints as much when he tells the inquiry commission 
that they probably will not uncover the inquisitorial 
technique of the Moscow trials. "The accused are not 
Trotskyites, nor Oppositionists, nor fighters, but docile 
capitulators. The GPU had educated them for these trials 
for years,tI Trotsky continued. ffThe GPU had educated 
them for these trials for years. That is why I think 
it e~tremely important, for the understanding of' the 
mechanics of the confessions, to bring out the psychology 
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of the capitulators as a political group." The key word 
in this statement is "psychology" because one of' the 
most feasible theories about the confessions states that 
the accused were subjected to mental conditioning that 
insured their saying what Vyshinsky wanted them to say. 
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There were also sensational theories about 
how the confessions were obtained. Davies discloses 
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the story of a theory relating to drugs: 
"The Ambassador called. He is 
very bitter against the Soviet regime. As to 
Radek's trial which is the sensation of the 
Diplomatic Corps this week, he thinks it is all 
a put-up job and an internal fight among the old 
Bolsheviks. He believes that the confessions were 
induced by all manner of threats and physical 
police methods. He told me quite an extraordinary 
tale which he had just heard. He said that a 
Polish citizen had been arrested in the Ukraine on 
the charge of being a spy. The Polish Embassy, so 
he understood, had been u~successful in securing 
his release so the Polish Government arrested two 
prominent Soviets in Poland. It resulted in an 
interchange of prisoners at the border. The Pole 
appeared to be a very sick man and was taken 
under observation and hospitalization by Polish 
medical experts. They arrived at the conclusion 
that he had been doped unconsciously by having 
utropin or some such drug administered to him in 
his food for the purpose of weakening his will. 
It is the first concrete statement that I have 
heard in connection with this general rumor as to 
the use of drugs--and this was hearsay and from 
a biased source." 
Barmine also dealt with the question of the 
confessions and analyzed why they had to be made. tlThey 
served to satisfy the masses that Stalin was protecting 
the Soviet workers and the revolution against Utraitors rt • 
He added that they proved to all future victims that 
"confessionu was useless and expressed the opinion that 
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the prosecution would find it impossible to· obtain 
further confessions. Three months later, however, the 
third and most notorious of the Moscow trials was held. 
For the defense against the numerous theories of how 
spurious confessions were obtained, R. T. Miller again 
sums up: tiThe defendants testified freely at all times, 
and were permitted to interrupt each other to corroborate 
or contradict testimony. Their manner was,. without 
exception, that of men who were describing facts. The 
notion that they were acting out previously assigned 
parts is difficult, for anyone who saw them, to credit •••• 
They admitted guilt and threw themselves on the mercy of 
the court. Were they dosed with a mysterious 'talking 
drug' or tortured? To believe so is impossible. Nimble 
witted Radek, surly Muralov, the jaunty gangster Shestov--
these were certainly not narcotized or mutilated men. 
Were they secretly promised clemency in return for con-
fessing? No serious observer believes this either. Radek, 
for instance, was at liberty long enough after Zinoviev's 
execution to know his fate only too well. And even if 
some Machiavellian authority had actually promised such 
commercial mercy, it is hard to think that shrewd Sokolnikov 
and Pyatakov would have been trapped by so obvious a swindle. 
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They confessed because the State's collection of evidence 
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forced them to. No other explanation fits the facts. tf 
In the 1937 trial, Radek offers a clue to the 
actual proceedure of the investigation and it seems logical 
enough to have some basis in fact. He stated that the 
chief examining official told him: "You are not a 
baby. Here you have fifteen people testifying against you. 
You cannot get out of it, and as a sensible man you 
cannot think of doing so. If you do not want to testify 
it can only be because you want to gain time and look it 
over more closely. Very well, study it." (The official 
apparently appealed to Radek's most vulnerable areas: 
his pride and self-respect). "For two and one-half months 
I tormented the examining official," Radek continued. 
"The question has been raised here whether we were tormented 
while under investigation. I must say that it was hot I 
who was tormented, but I who tormented the examining 
officials and compelled them to perform a lot of useless. 
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work. It 
John Gunther, another observer at the Moscow 
trials and not always reliable for accurate reporting, 
said the defendants were anything but glib andVyshinsky 
had to drag every bit of evidence from the accused against 
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their reluctant wills. 
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Legally, there is little to argue on against 
the verdict in the Moscow trials. Charles A. Beard 
in giving his reason for declining an invitation to serve 
on the Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky said 
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that "confessions are not wholly reliable evidence." 
He concludes, however, that the verdict rendered in the 
Moscow trials on the basis of the evidence given was the 
only verdict possible. Charles Warren, author of a 
standard book on the U. S. Supreme Court and an assistant 
attorney general under Woodrow Wilson, and Seth W. Richard-
son, assistant attorney general under Herbert Hoover, 
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both concurred with Beard's view. Moreover, two English 
attorneys, D. N. Pritt and Dudley Collard, sat in on the 
Moscow trials at the invitation of the Soviet Government 
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and both attested to the integrity of the proceedings. 
To return to Davies' view that Americans would 
be likely to judge the trials harshly because of differ-
ences in proceedure, several incidents during the trial 
accentuate these differences. A reading of the court 
record, with its multilateral development of the case, 
leaves the impression that Prosecutor Vyshinsky does not 
bother to be either logical or conclusive. He holds the 
big club in the form of bound volumes of testimony of the 
accused before him on his desk. If any defendant decided 
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to stray from his original story, Vyshinsky had only to 
pick up a book and read the accused his own words in a 
previously-signed confession. Unbiased observers in all 
parts of the world reasoned that, if the accused had been 
forced, drugged or bribed into making a confession, they 
could have cried out in open court against injustice. 
Oddly enough, just such an incident occurred in 
the third trial. (Whether it was planned to answer the 
critics or not is as enigmatical as almost any other 
question connected with the trial). 
On the very first day of the third trial (1938) 
Krestinsky snarled the proceedure by declaring that the 
whole volume of pre-trial testimony which he had signed 
was untrue and that he had signed it only in order to reach 
an open court where he could defend himself. All through 
that first day Krestinsky was adamant, maintaining that 
he was not a Trotskyite: 
VYSBINSKY: You were not a Trotskyite? 
KRESTINSKY: No. 
VYSHINSKY: Never? 
KRESTINSKY: Yes, I was a Trotskyite until 1927. 
VYSHINSKY: And when did you stop being a 
Trotskyite in 19271 
KRESTINSKY: Just before the Fifteenth Party 
Congress. 
VYSmNSKY: Recall the date. 
KRESTINSKY: I date my rupture with Trotsky from 
~ovember 27, 1927, when, through Serebryakov, who had 
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returned from America and was in MOscow, I sent a 
sharp letter containing sharp criticism. 
VYSHINSKY: That letter is not in the records. 
KRESTINSKY: The Letter I am referring to is 
in the possession of the Court Investigator, because 
it was taken from me during the search, and I request 
this letter to be attached to the records. 
VYSHINSKY: The records contain a letter dated 
July 11, 1927, taken from you during the search. 
KRESTINSKY: But there is another letter of 
November 27 ••• 
VYSHINSKY: There is no such letter. 
KRESTINSKY: That cannot be •••• tPage 53) 
Using the same technique he had employed against 
Smirnov two years before, Vyshinsky turned to Rosengoltz: 
VYSHINSKY: Do you take it that Krestinsky 
was a Trotskyite. 
ROSEl~GOLTZ: He is a Trotskyite. 
Follwwing this amazing bit of drama on the first 
day, an equally amazing shift has occurred by the time 
court reconvenes the next day. Vyshinsky put Rakovsky on 
the stand to testify that Krestinsky actually did write a 
letter to Trotsky on November 27, 1927, which denounced 
Trotsky and the whole Opposition. Vyshinsky was forced to 
backtrack because Krestinsky's letter had appeared in 
Izvestia and Pravda at the time. Rakovsky then went on to 
say that the letter was part of the whole plan to deceive 
the Party. Krestinsky really intended to work his way back 
into the Party while working always secretly for Trotsky. 
The prosecutor then wheels on Krestinsky: 
VYSHINSKY: Accused Krestinsky, did the accused 
Rakovsky understand the contents of your letter 
properly? 
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KRESTINSKY: He did. 
VYSIUNSKY: I have to make the following 
request of the court. The documents taken from 
Krestinsky during the search have at my request 
now been examined. Among them was a copy of his 
letter to Trotsky dated November 27, 1927, the 
very letter to which Krestinsky referred yesterday, 
and of which Rakovsky is speakibg. (Page 155) 
The clever prosecutor by only two words from 
the accused Krestinsky had wriggled from an embarrasing 
position. He then rubbed his victory further by asking 
Krestinsky why he dared to make a statement the previous 
day ttwhich cannot be regarded otherwise than as a piece 
of Trotskyite provocation in court." Krestinsky's reply: 
"Yesterday, under the influence of a momentary keen 
feeling of false shame, evoked by the atmosphere of the 
dock and the painful impression created by the public 
reading of the indictment, which was aggravated by my 
poor health, 1 could not bring myself to tell the truth 
•••• Instead of saying, 'Yes, I am guilty,' I almost 
mechanically answered, 'No, 1 am not guilty.' In the 
face of world public opinion, I had not the strength to 
admit the truth that I had been conducting a Trotskyite 
struggle all along. I request the court to register mw 
statement that I fully and completely admit that I am 
guilty of all the gravest charges brought against me 
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personally, and that I admit my complete responsibility 
for the treason and treachery I have committed." (Pages 157-8' 
Vyshinsky's victory in court was won. But the 
ep~sode only adds fuel to the question of what methods of 
obtaining confessions from the defendants was used. What 
took place with Krestinsky between court sessions on the 
first and second days. Something overnight convinced him 
and resolved his obstinate denial into docile admission of 
guilt. From the record itself, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether Krestinsky was telling the truth on the first 
day or the second day. Should the Moscow trials ever be 
prove a fabricated job, Krestinsky's momentary rebellion 
will take on even greater significance. 
The crowning observation on the methods of 
obtaining the confessions appears to be the one contained 
in the frank and preCise final plea of Nicolai Bukharin 
in the thiI~d trial. His first-hand analysis is worth 
repeating at length: 
tilt seems to me that when some American 
and Vlest European intellectuals begin to entertain 
doubts and vacillations in connection with the trials 
taking place in the U.S.S.R., this is primarily due 
to the fact that these people do not understand the 
radical distinction, namely, that in our country 
the antagonist, the enemy, has at the same time a 
divided, duel mind. 
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"Repentance is often attributed to 
diverse and absolutely absurd things like 
Thibetan powders and the like. I must say 
of myself that in prison, where I was confined 
for over a year, I worked, studied, and retained 
my clarity of mind. This will serve to refute by 
facts all fables and absurd counter-revolutionary 
tales. 
"Hypnotism is suggested. But I 
conducted my own defense in court, orientated 
myself on the spot, argued with the State 
Prosecutor; and anybody, even a man who has 
little experience in this branch of medicine, 
must admit that hypnotism of this kind is 
altogether impossible. 
"This repentance is often attributed 
to the Dostoyevsky mind, to the specific properties 
of the soul (L'ame slave). But that is not the 
case here at all. -L'ame slave- and the psychology 
of Dostoyevsky characters are a thing of the remote 
past in our country, the pluperfect tense ••••. 
"I shall now speak of myself, of my 
reasons for repentance .••• For three months I 
refused to say anything. Then I began to testify. 
Why? Because while in prison, I made a revaluation of 
my entire past. For when you ask yourself: "If 
you must die, what are you dying for?"--an abso-
lutely black vacuity suddenly rises before you 
with startling vividness. There was nothing to 
die for, if one wanted to die unrepented. 
"And, on the contrary, everything positive 
that glistens in the Soviet Union acquires new 
dimensions in a man's mind. This in the end 
disarmed me completely and led me to bend my knees 
before the Party and the country. 
"And when you ask yourself: 'Very well, 
suppose you do not die; suppose by SQme miracle you 
remain alive, again what for? Isolated from every-
body, an enemy of the people, in an inhuman position, 
completely isolated from everything that constitutes 




til happened by chance to get Feuchtwanger's 
book from the prison library. There he refers to the 
trials of the Trotskyites. It produced a profound 
impression on me; but I must say that Feuchtwanger 
did not get at the core of the matter. He stopped 
halfway, not everything was clear to him. His 
arguments are· absolutely false. 
"I am about to finish. I am perhaps 
speaking for the last time in my life •••• " (Pages 777-8) 
In many respects, Bukharin's words amount to 
irrefutable argument. And yet there is something too 
neatly convenient for propaganda purposes, something too 
smug, something that fails to convince beyond any doubt. 
This same lack characterizes the whole of the official 
report of the court proceedings. Perhaps it is only as 
Davies put it: "more left unsaid than actually had 
been said." But it. is abundantly clear to most readers 
that the case Vyshinsky built up against the accused in 
court was far from convincing. The Russian document is 
its own worst recoIDrrlendation. 
2. Was Trotsky Guilty 
It would be hard to believe that Trotsky did 
not, until the day of his untimely death in 1940, by 
fair means and foul, work with tireless energy toward 
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the restoration of his leadership in the Soviet Union. 
Neither is it wholly impossible to believe that Trotsky 
would not stoop to agreements with capitalistic countries 
to play the role of an opportunist. In either case, he 
. would not be wholly out of character. He had dealt with 
the Germans at Brest-Litovsk. 
On the other hand, it seems illogical that Trotsky 
was as formidable an enemy to the Soviet leadership as 
Vyshinsky pictured him. In the second trial, a handful 
of Trotskyites were pictured as having virtual control 
of all Soviet industry eventhough the prosecution could 
not deny that the conspirators had no formal and regular 
meetings and all their contacts were casual and accidental. 
If the various members of the plot were working on their 
own iniative, Trotsky would scarcely have been able to 
master-mind the conspiracy from afar. There was not the 
close-knit organization to paralyze the Soviet Union or 
even direct its forces into diversive channels. As John 
Dewey observed: "You know, it would be ridiculous, this 
whole Trotsky business, if its effects had not been so 
disastrous. Whatever you think about it, it is a fan-
tastic supposition that Trotsky, an exile, with a couple 
of secretaries at most, constantly under police surveillance 
and driven from one country to another, should be able 
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to upset Russia." 
. .
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The least that can be charged of the Soviet 
charges is that they grossly exaggerated Trotsky's 
true role and importance. It may be true also, as 
Trotsky attempted to prove, that Pyatakov did not meet 
him in Oslo; that Vladimir Romm, the Russian correspondent, 
did not meet him in Paris; that Bermin-Yurin, Holtzman and 
Fritz David did not talk to him in Copenhagen, eventhough 
they testified to that effect. Perhaps these men were 
lying. If Trotsky's evidence is valid to the slightest 
degree, there is no question but that they were lying. 
What made them consent, if they did, to relate 
untruths regarding Trotsky--assuming that Vyshinsky invented 
Trotsky's cormection with the conspiracy to help kill his 
influence in the Soviet Union. One of the most widely 
discussed theories on this point attributes the cause to 
psychological, as Bukharin and Radek testified. The GPU 
may have confronted each new suspect with the ancient ruse 
of signed accusations from other defendants. By police 
method, physical or psychological, the will of the suspect 
was worn away until all that remained of importance for him 
to live for, the ideal that had been the fuel of his mind 
and sould for decades, was the Socialistic society and its 
one nationalistic expression, the Soviet Union. By the time 
the victim reached the futile dilemna confessed by Bukharin, 
he would have remembered every conversation with every 
person--Trotsky above all--which had even slightly resembled 
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dissatisfaction or disapproval of the Party leadership. 
Resigned to sure death, the victim had a choice of making 
one last eloquent gesture in behalf of the Communist 
Party and the Soviet Union, namely, to heap recrimination 
upon themselves for ever disagreeing with Stalin, to admit 
profusely the superiority of the Stalin policy and, finally, 
to help indict, even to the point of outright lying about, 
Stalin's arch foe and accuser, Leon Trotsky. It is a 
confused, disorderly mass of data which the reports of the 
MOscow represents. The confusion in the minds of the 
'accused may have been reflected in a loss of chronological 
perspective •. For this reason, the defendants are not 
able to distinguish the struggle of 1923-27 from the 
struggle of 1932-36 as demonstrated by those who speak 
in consecutive sentences about one and then the other. 
Theoretically, it is possible to conceive of 
Trotsky as entirely unrelated to the conspiracy, which may 
actually have existed. It was been suggested that Trotsky's 
role may have 'been a clever invention by the defendants to 
help divert attention from the real character of the con-
spiracy. This would fit in with the picture of the accused 
in the various trials attempting to protect others who had 
not been discovered. This line of reasoning could 
conceivably remove the question of Trotsky's guilt from the 
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whole field of consideration of the trials. This 
possibility seems remote, however. Trotsky fought a 
heated fight and lost. The enigma of his true tole in 
counter-revolutionary activity after 1929 is part of 
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